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Abstract
This paper shows that in an open economy, general price level in-
flation targeting may provide large wage setters with little incentive
for wage restraint. This contradicts recent developments within the
inflation targeting literature, and the discrepency is due to the asym-
metric impact exchange rate changes have on sectors shielded from,
and sectors open to, international trade. By disciplining unions in
the non-shielded sectors, exchange rate targeting yields higher em-
ployment than inflation targeting when unions in the open sector are
strong relative to their shielded sector counterparts. In the opposite
case, when unions are stronger in the shielded sector, we show that
general price level inflation targeting is inferior to an inflation target
that focuses only on shielded sector prices.
Keywords: Inflation targeting, unemployment, monetary policy,
unions, shielded and non-shielded sectors.
JEL classification: E52, E58, F41, J51, L16.
1 Introduction
According to recent literature on monetary policy and large wage- and price-
setters, the choice of policy target may have long-term real eﬀects, contrary
to conventional wisdom. Iversen and Soskice (1999), Bratsiotis and Martin
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Dagestad, Bjørn Sandvik, Odd Rune Straume, Steinar Vagstad and seminar participants
both at the University of Bergen and the CEPR conference ‘Globalization and labour
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(1999), Coricelli et al. (2003, 2004) and Soskice and Iversen (2000) all find
that a more conservative central bank/ more strict inflation targeting may
contribute to lower unemployment.1 In a purely unionized setting, the reason
for this result is basically that if unions increase their wages, strict monetary
policies dampen price adjustments, and thus contribute to increased nega-
tive labor demand eﬀects. Accordingly, strict monetary policies induce low
unemployment by disciplining unions.2 This paper builds much on the same
premises as these earlier studies, but discusses monetary policy within a two-
sector model. Through the eﬀect on the exchange rate, diﬀerent policies may
aﬀect sectors open to direct international competition and those that are not,
in quite dissimilar ways. The resulting asymmetric impact on shielded and
non-shielded sectors is the focus of this paper.
Another important backdrop of the present paper, is the fact that union
influence varies considerably not only across countries, but also across sectors
within countries. Table 1 shows collective bargaining coverage for the private
and public sector in selected European countries in 2001 (%):
Table 1
Country Private sector Public sector
Austria 98 0
Denmark 71 100
Germany West (a)70 nd
Germany East (a)55 nd
Hungary 31 31
Netherlands 86 100
Norway (b)63 (b)100
Portugal (c)89 81
Slovakia 34 59
Slovenia 100 100
Sweden >90 100
Great Britain 22 73
Source: Eiro (2003), nd = no data; a,b,c = in years 2000, 1998, 1999
1Earlier literature, by focusing on inflation-averse unions, obtained the opposite result.
See Skott (1997), Jensen (1997), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999,
2002), Lippi (2002) and Jerger (2002). For a survey of both types of approaches, see
Cukierman (2002). See also Lippi (2003).
2This argument is generally not valid if there is only one large wage setter — then
this union may only take relative wages into consideration, and the classical dichotomy
between monetary policies and real variables, hold. However, with multiple wage setters,
relative prices do not enter the maximand in the same way, and the changing of absolute
prices matters. For further discussion, see Soskice and Iversen (2000) and Section 8 of this
paper.
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The general gist of this table, that substantial sectoral diﬀerences exist, is
also confirmed if sectors are divided by industry (EIRO, 2003).3 With such
diﬀerences in union presence across sectors, and noting that monetary policy
may aﬀect unions in diﬀerent sectors asymmetrically, the question arises of
what this all has to say for the attractiveness of monetary policies. We argue
that, although it is unreasonable to design monetary policy solely to discipline
unions, insofar as this is an important consideration, inflation targeting may
be an inferior target given the observed inter-sectoral asymmetries. While
pinpointing the general price level, inflation targeting leaves shielded and
non-shielded sector prices adjustable. In a small, open economy, prices would
typically be less adjustable (to domestic wages) in non-shielded sectors than
in shielded sectors under exchange rate targeting, since import prices are
then non-aﬀected by domestic developments. Conversely, under an inflation
target focusing only on the shielded sector, the prices in this sector would
be less adjustable. These two other types of monetary targets may therefore
induce more union wage-discipline in the non-shielded and shielded sectors,
respectively, than does general price level inflation targeting. In the present
model, we show that if unions are stronger in either of the two sectors,
disciplining these unions through the appropriate choice of monetary target,
increases equilibrium employment beyond the level under general price level
inflation targeting.
Holden (2003a) and Vartiainen (2002) use a similar two-sector set-up to
ours, though without labor market asymmetries. The authors discuss fixed
exchange rates and general price level inflation targeting, and their focus is
mainly on wages and prices. This paper replicates their main result: If there
is a shift from an exchange rate target to an inflation target (country-wide),
real wages in the sector shielded from foreign competition are decreased,
while the opposite is true in the non-shielded sector.4 While this result
is basically robust to the diﬀering labor market structures introduced in
the present paper, the same is not true for the monetary policy-objective’s
eﬀect on total employment. The paper by Vartiainen does not address this
question, but Holden argues (using numerical simulations) that aggregate
employment will ‘in most cases’ be higher under inflation targeting than
given fixed exchange rates. We show the reverse to be true whenever wage
setting is more centralized in the non-shielded sector than in the shielded
sector. The reason is that the shift from exchange rate targeting to inflation
targeting yields lower discipline on non-shielded sector unions and more on
3For data on union density, see for instance Booth et al. (2001) p. 26.
4In the present paper, we obtain the ‘complementary’ eﬀect: Equilibrium employment
increases in the shielded sector and decreases in the non-shielded sector.
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shielded sector unions, a move which may lead to higher unemployment if
unions are stronger (here; fewer) in the shielded sector relative to the non-
shielded sector.
Mankiw and Reis (2003) is another interesting paper where the authors
discuss alternative measures for the prices targeted by the central bank. The
focus in that paper is stabilization (of economic activity), and one of the main
results is that the more flexible prices are in a sector, the less they should be
weighted in the price index used to target inflation.5 To the extent that less
flexible prices correspond to more monopoly power in that sector, our results
can be interpreted as augmenting the stability argument, since focusing on
the ‘less competitive’ sector may also yield higher equilibrium employment.
2 The model
An economy has two sectors, each producing one distinct good. Sectors are
indexed by s ∈ {1, 2} and goods by g ∈ {1, 2}. Sector 1, which produces
good 1, is shielded from foreign competition in the sense that no perfect
substitute can be imported. However, there exists an imperfect substitute
(good 2) produced in sector 2 and abroad. The country is assumed to be
small relative to the world with respect to the market for good 2. The world
price of this product, p∗2, is thus assumed fixed.
Consumer preferences are described by a twin Cobb Douglas utility func-
tion of the following form:
U(x1, x2, y) = (
√
x1x2)
α(y)1−α,α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where y is leisure and xg is the amount of good g consumed by the individual
in question. There are N individuals populating the economy, k of which are
stockholders (assumed to have exogenously determined leisure) and n = N−k
2
is the number of workers in each sector.6 ,7
We assume labor migration between sectors to be negligible within the
short-term scope of the model (to be explained below), and wages are de-
termined by unions prior to production. The choice of a monopoly union
model is made to make analytical headway. With monopoly unions, union
5Aoki (2001) obtains a similar result. See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
6The income of stockholder i is assumed to be a fraction φi of total profits in the
economy.
Pk
i=1 φ
i = 1.
7The main results of the paper carry through to the situation where the number of
workers in each sector are not equal, but for analytical convenience we assume equal
division of workers between sectors.
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strength — which according to the remarks made in the introduction, is ex-
pected to be important to the results — cannot be measured through union
bargaining power. Again, for tidy symmetric results, we choose to assume
full (total) union coverage and work with the number of unions in the two
sectors (the degree of centralization in wage setting) as the premier (inverse)
measure of union strength. There are ms ≥ 1 unions in sector s, and these
are all sector specific. In addition, unions within a sector are equally large
and workers within a single firm is always covered by the same union (which
may also cover workers in other firms). Assuming fs ≥ ms firms in sector s,
this means that each union in sector s has n
ms
members, working in fs
ms
firms,
and both these numbers are integers.
The number of firms in each sector is assumed fixed, and all firms are
price takers operating under decreasing returns with labor as the only input.
They maximize
Πjs = ps(L
j
s)
γ − wjsLjs, γ ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where subscripts refer to sectors, and superscripts refer to firms, j ∈ {1, .., fs}.
Ljs is the total labor input utilized by firm j, ps is the price of the sector s
good and wjs is the wage faced by firm j in sector s. Each firm in sector s has
access to a fixed stock of workers, which is the equal share of the total work
force to firms; n
fs
. However, the firms are only required to pay these workers
for the amount of work they do.8
With p∗2 assumed fixed, the domestic economy being small and allowing
for costless trade, the domestic price for the sector 2 good is simply
p2 =
p∗2
E
, (3)
where E is the nominal exchange rate. When the Central Bank increases its
interest rates, it is commonly asserted that consumption and investment drop
while the nominal exchange rate appreciates. In this static model, there is no
investment or intertemporal saving. Thus we assume that the Central Bank,
by setting the interest rate, influences the nominal exchange rate only. This
could be thought of as a short term approximation to the behavior of a more
complex economy, as exchange rate movements tend to come about much
faster than changes in investment or saving. For simplicity, we assume that
8Thus there is strictly speaking no ‘unemployment’ in this model. This set-up is used
purely for analytical convenience, as we do not want to focus on insider-outsider problems
in this paper. However, it is clear that a drop in employment per worker in our model
could equally well be interpreted as an increase in unemployment (see for instance Holden
(2003a)).
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by appropriately adjusting the interest rate, the Central Bank may induce
any desired level of the nominal exchange rate, and thus E is modelled as
the (only) Central Bank policy instrument. This assumption is the same as
in Holden (2003a) and Vartiainen (2002).9
The sequence of events is as follows: First, the monetary policy objective
is determined. On the second stage, unions simultaneously choose wages, and
on the third stage, the Central Bank sets the interest rate, which determines
the exchange rate.10 Finally, production occurs and prices are determined.
We solve, of course, by backwards induction. The following section presents
the fourth stage equilibrium in prices. Section 4 addresses the behavior of
unions, also determining some essential elasticities needed in the following
analysis. We then turn to discussing diﬀerent monetary policies, starting
with a fixed exchange rate in Section 5. Inflation targeting is discussed in
Section 6, while a shielded sector inflation/price target is discussed in Section
7. Section 8 discusses the role of the numeraire, and Section 9 concludes.
3 Third stage equilibrium
We defer the calculations of the third stage equilibrium in prices to Appendix
A. The relative prices ensuring that domestic supply equals domestic demand
for the shielded sector good, are given by:
p1
p2
= K := (
Pf2
j=1(
1
wj2
)
γ
1−γPf1
j=1(
1
wj1
)
γ
1−γ
)(1−γ). (4)
In the non-shielded sector, domestic supply need not equal domestic demand
since there is also a foreign market for this good. However, the above relative
prices will also imply that supply and demand are equal in the non-shielded
sector. Thus trade will be balanced in equilibrium.
As discussed, we will assume that the monetary authority can change
the nominal exchange rate, and thus adjust p2. The above equation shows
that if wage setting was exogenous to the monetary rule, an exchange rate
adjustment (a change in p2) would only lead to a proportional adjustment
of p1. This is the well known and time-honored ‘neutrality of money’ result.
However, as pointed out by Soskice and Iversen (2000), the presence of non-
atomistic agents may cause the breakdown of money neutrality. Technically,
9Mankiw and Reis (2003) also discuss price targeting in a single period model, but
without specifying the route through which monetary control is implemented.
10It is reasonably assumed that wage-setting is a more long-term commitment than the
setting of interest rates by the Central Bank.
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the right hand side of (4) may change due to a change in monetary regime.
The breakdown of money neutrality is further addressed in Section 8.
4 Union wage setting
We assume that unions maximize the utility of a representative member. To
calculate the expected utility of workers in the two sectors, we need to find
both the equilibrium leisure and consumption as functions of wages. How-
ever, maximizing utility is the same as maximizing a Cobb Douglas composite
of real income and leisure when work is rationed.11 Thus, for any individual
with income M ,
U = (
√
x1x2)
α(y)1−α = (
M
P
)α(T − l)1−α, (5)
where T is the total number of available hours for work and leisure, l is
the individual’s labor supply and P is the ideal consumer price index (see
Appendix A).
We assume that every union sets the same wage for all the firms they
cover. The utility of a member of union u ∈ {1, ...,ms} in sector s is then
given by:
Uus = (
wus l
u
s
P
)α(T − lus )1−α. (6)
Since every firm employing workers covered by union u has the same costs,
face the same prices and produce using the same technology, labor demand
is also the same for all firms covered by the same union. Consequently, lus is
the same for all workers covered by union u.12
The first-order condition for union utility maximization is
α
1− α(
1− πus
λus
+ 1) =
lus
T − lus
, (7)
where
λus : =
wus
lus
∂lus
∂wus
, (8)
πus : =
wus
P
∂P
∂wus
. (9)
11Work will be rationed whenever workers would be willing to work more than demanded
by the employers at the prevailing wage. This is discussed in Appendix A and C.
12 lus equals fs
Ljs
n for all firms j covered by union u.
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Thus the fraction of employment to leisure, l
u
s
T−lus
, aimed for by union u is a
function of the general price and employment demand elasticities to wages
(πus and λ
u
s , respectively).
lus
T−lus
can be thought of as an employment index.
Through the monetary targets, the Central Bank will set a nominal ex-
change rate, in turn deciding the non-shielded sector price, p2. How p2 is
changed to account for diﬀerent wage schedules depends crucially on the
monetary target. To ease the exposition, it is now advantageous to compute
the above elasticities, πus and λ
u
s , in terms of the elasticity of p2 (eﬀectively
the Central Bank policy instrument) to wages. Since every union within a
sector is exactly equal, they would all face the same elasticities of demand
and prices with respect to own wages if faced with the same ‘outside’ wages.
Symmetric wage game equilibria then exist, and we therefore present the
elasticities in the symmetric cases where wages are equal across unions in
each sector; wus = ws, ∀u ∈ {1, ..,ms} (see appendix A). With superscripts
dropped,
λ1 =
1
1− γ (κ1 +
w1
p2
∂p2
∂w1
− 1), (10)
λ2 =
1
1− γ (
w2
p2
∂p2
∂w2
− 1) (11)
and
πs =
1
2
[κs + 2
ws
p2
∂p2
∂ws
], (12)
where
κ1 =
γ
m1
, (13)
κ2 = −
γ
m2
. (14)
We now turn to discuss the various monetary objectives in greater depth.
5 Fixed exchange rates
In this case, the Central Bank intervenes only to keep the exchange rate
at a pre-determined level. p2 is thus assumed fixed and, more importantly,
non-determined by internal factors. Consequently w
u
s
p2
∂p2
∂wus
= 0 for all unions.
Thus, in terms of the above elasticities, we have
πs =
1
2
κs, (15)
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λ1 =
1
1− γ (κ1 − 1), (16)
and
λ2 = −
1
1− γ . (17)
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the first-order conditions for the unions
in sector 1 and 2, respectively, are (having imposed a symmetric solution)
α
1− α(
1
2
γ
2m1 − 1− γ
m1 − γ
) =
l1
T − l1
, (18)
α
1− α(
1
2
γ
2m2 − 1 + γ
m2
) =
l2
T − l2
. (19)
The Nash equilibrium wage outcome is not readily available from the above
expressions. However, we do not need to find the equilibrium wages. The
above expressions provide us with the employment level aimed for by the
unions. Any non-negative employment level can be induced by the union
with an appropriately chosen wage level (there is imperfect substitutability
between the goods produced in the two sectors). The employment indices
determined above thus provide us with the flip-side of the coin; the employ-
ment level in equilibrium. Before going into the above result in more detail,
we also determine employment in the inflation targeting regime.
6 Inflation targeting
In our static model, inflation targeting takes the simplified form of targeting
a price level. We choose to assume that the price level targeted by the
Central Bank is the ideal price index (see Appendix A). This is given by
PCB = 2p2
√
K. Thus, the price of the sector 2 good responds to wages
according to the following formulae:
p2 =
PCB
2
√
K
. (20)
This response is induced by the Central Bank, adjusting the exchange rate
to keep the general price level at the specified target level.
Given this response, we can easily calculate the missing elasticities from
Section 4:
∂p2
∂wus
wus
p2
= −1
2
κs. (21)
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πs is of course zero, since the Central Bank does not allow for the general
price level to change.
Now, again imposing a symmetric equilibrium, we have λ1 = 11−γ (
1
2
γ
m1
−1)
and λ2 = 11−γ (
1
2
γ
m2
−1). Thus, under inflation targeting, equilibrium employ-
ment in sector s is implicitly given by
α
1− α(γ
2ms − 1
2ms − γ
) =
ls
T − ls
. (22)
We now proceed directly to determining the relative employment levels under
the inflation targeting and fixed exchange rate regimes.
6.1 Fixed exchange rates versus inflation targeting
From the above results, we find:
Proposition 1 Employment per worker is under both inflation targeting and
exchange rate targeting higher in the sector where wage setting is least cen-
tralized.
Proof. Under the fixed exchange rate regime, relative employment in the
two sectors is given by
η :=
l1
T−l1
l2
T−l2
=
2m1−1−γ
m1−γ
2m2−1+γ
m2
=
2m1 − 1− γ
(m1 − γ) (2m2 − 1 + γ)
m2. (23)
η > (<)1 for m2 < (>)m1 − γ. Since γ < 1, this proves the proposition in
the exchange rate case (m1 and m2 are integers). For the inflation targeting
regime
η =
(2m1 − 1)(2m2 − γ)
(2m2 − 1)(2m1 − γ)
.
η > (<)1 for m2 < (>)m1.
This result may seem at odds with the familiar Calmfors-Driﬃll hump
shape13, but this is not necessarily so. Since we are only discussing sector-
specific unions, unions in a sector — no matter how large they are — never take
into direct consideration how their wage setting aﬀects workers (or stockhold-
ers) in the other sector.14 Thus the eﬀect that would discipline unions under
13Calmfors and Driﬃll (1985). See also Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993, 1997).
14However, unions do indirectly care about workers in the other sector, since a possibly
significant part of the negative labor demand eﬀect of a wage increase, consists of a decrease
in purchases made by other workers.
10
higher levels of centralization in a Calmfors-Driﬃll-type model — the internal-
ization of inter-sectoral price spillovers — is not present in this model. In line
with the discussion in the introduction, we would argue that the exclusion of
such eﬀects would be far from unreasonable. Indeed Knell (2002) argues that
the ongoing process of deregulation and globalization may have contributed
to a situation where centralized wage-bargaining systems are no longer advan-
tageous (relative to intermediate structures).15 However, if we for instance
introduced a single union covering all workers in the economy, we find (not
shown) that employment would be at the same level as in the completely de-
centralized case (infinite number of unions in both sectors), thus illustrating
that a Calmfors-Driﬃll hump-shape could materialize if such inter-sectoral
eﬀects were introduced.
Finally, it should be noted that if there is an equal number of unions in
the two sectors, employment per worker is strictly higher in the non-shielded
sector relative to the shielded sector under a fixed exchange rate regime and
exactly equal to the employment in the shielded sector under price targeting.
The next question we ask is what happens to employment if we go from
a fixed exchange rate regime to a regime with inflation targeting. It is easily
shown that employment (both per worker and sector wide) in the shielded
sector increases, while employment in the non-shielded sector is reduced:
Proposition 2 Unions in the shielded sector are more disciplined — yielding
higher employment in this sector — under inflation targeting than under a
fixed exchange rate regime. The opposite is true for unions in the non-shielded
sector.
Proof.
lI1 > l
E
1 ⇔
γ(1− γ) > 0, (24)
lE2 > l
I
2 ⇔
1
2
γ
1− γ
m2 (2m2 − γ)
> 0, (25)
where superscripts I and E denote inflation targeting and exchange rate
targeting respectively. Both (24) and (25) hold under the assumptions of the
model.
To understand this result, it is important to realize that a wage increase
by a union can have a direct impact on both the price level in the relevant
sector and the labor demand faced by the union members. Typically, when
15See also Molle (2002).
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(marginal) costs go up, prices may increase and production drops. These two
eﬀects are interrelated, as a larger price increase would imply that production
drops less, all else equal. However, the union will always prefer a situation
where production, and hence, labor demand, drops by a small amount and
prices instead increase more. The basic reason is that the workers of a union
do not bear the full costs of the price increase (even when there is only one
union in the sector). In contrast, a labor demand drop does not imply the
same kind of spillover to other workers and stockholders in the economy.
Consequently, in the present model — and we would anticipate in much more
general settings — any policy rendering prices rigid in a sector leads to lower
wages and higher employment in this sector.16
With this in mind, it is easy to understand why unions in the non-shielded
sector are more disciplined under the fixed exchange rate regime than un-
der inflation targeting: Under fixed exchange rates, the sector 2 price level
is eﬀectively fixed. Thus the drop in labor demand associated with a wage
increase is very high, and unions choose low wages and obtain high employ-
ment. Under inflation targeting, however, a wage increase by a sector 2 union
is allowed to spill over into a higher price in this sector through the following
equilibrium eﬀects: A wage increase reduces profits and can be shown also
to reduce labor income in sector 2. This reduces the demand for both non-
shielded and shielded sector goods. The reduction in demand in the shielded
sector would lead to a lower price in this sector. However, the price/inflation
targeting Central Bank will not allow such a price decrease, since this would
decrease the general price level. To compensate, the Central Bank decreases
interest rates and induces an exchange rate depreciation. This, in turn, in-
creases prices in the non-shielded sector. The end result of a wage increase
by the non-shielded sector unions is thus a price increase in sector 2. More
importantly, the increase in the sector 2 prices contributes to a lower drop
in labor demand in sector 2. Following the above discussion, this will then
make the sector 2 unions less willing to keep wages low, and accordingly em-
ployment is lower under inflation targeting than under a fixed exchange rate
regime.
The opposite result holds for the shielded sector unions. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, a wage increase in the shielded sector leads to a rela-
tively large increase in prices in this sector.17 Under inflation targeting, the
above price increase is fought oﬀ by the Central Bank aiming to keep the
16Although not explained in detail by the authors, this intuition would apply equally to
the discussion in Holden (2003a) and Vartiainen (2002).
17The underlying eﬀects are as follows: The wage increase decreases supply, given prices.
As before, though, demand also decreases. However, the decrease in supply is larger than
the decrease in demand, leading to higher prices and lower demand for labor.
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price level down. This is done by inducing an exchange rate appreciation,
leading to lower prices in the non-shielded sector. However, this spills over
into the shielded sector through lower demand (reduced profits and labor in-
come in sector 2). The reduced demand works contrary to the supply-driven
increase in prices in the shielded sector, and it contributes to a more severe
reduction in labor demand. Consequently, unions in the shielded sector are
more disciplined under inflation targeting than under a fixed exchange rate
regime.
The results of this section are not really new. As discussed in the intro-
duction, Holden (2003a) and Vartiainen (2002) address the same questions
and obtain similar results. There is no hiding that the present paper is in
some respects simpler than the two other papers.18 However, this paper of-
fers a diﬀerent set-up along the union strength dimension: In both Holden
(2003a) and Vartiainen (2002), there is (eﬀectively) a single union in both
sectors. In our model, we do not impose any a priori assumptions on the
number of unions or the distribution of these unions across sectors. As we
have seen, the above results do not depend on this assumption. In this re-
spect, we have provided a generalization of these two other papers. However,
the assumption also proves critical in assessing the impact of the diﬀerent
policy targets on total employment.
6.2 Total employment
What then happens to total employment in the economy? Relative employ-
ment in the two monetary regimes discussed so far is given by:
Λ :=
nlI1 + nl
I
2
nlE1 + nl
E
2
=
α
1−αγ
2m1−1
2m1−γ
T
1+ α
1−αγ
2m1−1
2m1−γ
+
α
1−αγ
2m2−1
2m2−γ
T
1+ α
1−αγ
2m2−1
2m2−γ
α
1−α
1
2
γ 2m1−1−γ
m1−γ
T
1+ α
1−α
1
2
γ 2m1−1−γ
m1−γ
+
α
1−α
1
2
γ 2m2−1+γ
m2
T
1+ α
1−α
1
2
γ 2m2−1+γ
m2
. (26)
It can be shown that Λ has the following properties:19
Λ > 1 for m2 ≥ m1 (27)
Λ < 1 for m2 < m1 (28)
As it turns out, whenm2 ≥ m1, total employment is higher in the inflation
targeting regime, while the opposite is true for m2 < m1. Inflation targeting
18Especially; demand is Cobb Douglas, while the authors work with CES-utility in the
two other papers — albeit in Holden’s case by simulations.
19Solving for Λ = 1, gives m1−m2 = γ2 . However, due to the whole number restriction,
m1 −m2 can never equal γ2 and m2 < m1 is equivalent to m2 ≤ m1 − 1.
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disciplines shielded sector unions, and the disciplining eﬀect has a larger
potential to increase employment in the sector where there are larger (i.e.
more powerful) unions. Thus the employment eﬀect in the shielded sector
more than balances the negative employment eﬀect in the non-shielded sector
when there are relatively more unions in the non-shielded sector. We state
this result as a proposition:
Proposition 3 Inflation targeting (Fixed exchange rates) will induce higher
total employment than exchange rate targeting (inflation targeting) if wage
setting is more centralized in the shielded (non-shielded) sector than in the
non-shielded (shielded) sector.
Total employment is not discussed in Vartiainen (2002), but Holden
(2003a) finds that “Numerical simulations suggest that in most cases overall
welfare and aggregate employment are higher under a price target than un-
der an exchange rate target”. This result is only replicated in this model for
m2 ≥ m1, illustrating the potential importance of focusing on labor market
asymmetries.20 Welfare in this model is discussed in Meland (2004). Numer-
ical simulations strongly suggest that welfare always follows employment in
this model — that is whenever total employment is increased by the choice of
monetary target, welfare is also increased, and vice versa.
7 A shielded sector price target
In this section, we explore the possibility that the central bank may choose an
inflation target that focuses more on shielded sector prices. More precisely,
we assume that the Central Bank is given the task to target inflation in
the shielded sector only. Again, in our static model, this is equivalent to a
shielded sector price target.21
We assume that p1 = P1 is the target level which eventually will be
induced by the Central Bank. In this case p2 = P1K . We then have
∂p2
∂wus
wus
p2
=
−κs and λ1 = − 11−γ , λ2 = −
1
1−γ (κ2 + 1) and πs = −
1
2
κs. In a symmetric
20Holden (2003a) and Vartiainen (2002) discuss interesting scenarios pertaining to dif-
ferent supply technology and demand functions, which we will not touch upon.
21It is worth noting that implementing a shielded sector inflation targeting regime would
be no more diﬃcult for the monetary authorities than implementing an inflation targeting
regime based on the general price level. Actually, it could be simpler, as knowledge of only
a fraction of the prices is needed.
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equilibrium,
α
1− α(
1
2
γ
2m1 − 1 + γ
m1
) =
l1
T − l1
, (29)
α
1− α(
1
2
γ
2m2 − 1− γ
m2 − γ
) =
l2
T − l2
. (30)
Strictly speaking, we could have anticipated this result from the start. Paying
close attention to the expressions, we see that they are exactly the same as for
the fixed exchange rate regime, only with the two sectors switched. Shielded
sector price/inflation targeting works in the shielded sector exactly the same
way as the fixed exchange rate worked in the non-shielded sector: It fixes
prices in that sector. The results for the shielded sector price target and
fixed exchange rates are therefore exactly symmetric. The discussion under
fixed exchange rates can now be reapplied, only replacing sector 1 with sector
2 and vice versa.
As a direct consequence, depending on the number of workers and unions
in each sector, either fixed exchange rate targeting or shielded sector price
targeting produces higher employment than the general inflation targeting
regime. The only exception is the symmetric case, m1 = m2. To see this,
note that we found that for m1 ≤ m2, employment is higher in the inflation
targeting regime than in the fixed exchange rate regime. Accordingly, tar-
geting the general price level rather than the shielded price level will yield
higher employment if m2 ≤ m1. The only case where inflation targeting will
dominate both exchange rate targeting and a shielded sector price target in
terms of employment, is for m1 = m2.22
Again, we summarize the above results as a Proposition:
Proposition 4 :
1. Only for countries where the levels of centralization in wage setting
are relatively equal across sectors, will inflation targeting yield higher
equilibrium employment than both fixed exchange rates and a regime
targeting inflation in the shielded sector only.
2. If the level of centralization in wage setting is higher (lower) in the
shielded sector than in the non-shielded sector, shielded sector inflation
targeting (exchange rate targeting) produces higher employment than
either of the two other monetary targets.
22Welfare again follows suit.
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Of course, the present model is highly stylized. Looking beyond the
constraints of the model, however, what we should learn from this is that
relative union strength may be important for the employment eﬀects of dif-
ferent monetary policies, and that the stronger unions are in a sector, the
more important it may be to restrict price movements in this sector.
7.1 Other monetary targets
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the monetary policy that disci-
plines union wage setting the most (over all), also produces higher employ-
ment (and welfare). Accordingly, this is indeed a “union bashing” model,
where the eﬀects of monetary policy on aggregate outcomes are associated
only with wage discipline. With this focus, could not policy be arranged in
such a way that wage increases are explicitly fought oﬀ by the central bank
(wage-targeting), thereby creating higher employment? The answer to this
question is in the aﬃrmative. However, the present model disregards any
other issues more commonly discussed in relation to monetary targets (for
instance output and exchange rate volatility). For this reason, we restrict
attention to targets that are presumed to be more suitable as the basis of
actual monetary policy, both for economic and political reasons.23 ,24 One
such target that has been discussed is production targets. In Appendix D,
calculations for a range of nominal production targets are provided. These
calculations show that no such target is able to outperform the better of
the above targets when it comes to inducing high levels of employment.
The basic reason behind this result is that nominal production targets do
worse than price/inflation levels in ‘punishing’ high wages by unions. Con-
sider a given wage increase by a union. As previously discussed, the wage
increase could increase prices and/or decrease labor demand facing the rel-
evant union. Thus the value of production, which is essentially a product
of these two eﬀects, could be less dependent upon wages than prices alone
23A possible example of a more direct ‘union bashing’ rule is E = f(−→w ), where −→w is a
vector of all union wages, wi, and
∂f
∂wi
< 0. In this case, an increase in wages from any
union, will increase the exchange rate, hurting labor in both sectors. However, this would
also amount to an ‘instrument rule’, rather than a ‘targeting rule’ (Svensson (2002, 2003)).
Targeting the general price level or the exchange rate only specifies the goal, which in a
richer set-up, leaves the Central Bank with the option of choosing the way to respond in
order to achieve the target. An instrument rule, on the other hand, portray exactly how
the interest rates (e.g. the exchange rate) should respond to the previously set wages. As
noted by Svensson, an instrument rule may therefore be economically undesirable as it
deprives the Central Bank of any possibility to respond flexibly to shocks in the economy.
24A wage-targeting policy may prove highly provocative to unions and their members,
and as such, be politically unfeasible.
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would be. Consequently, targeting prices is a more precise way of tackling
high wages than targeting the value of production. This is summarized in
the following proposition:25
Proposition 5 Nominal production targets induce lower total employment
than, at least, the better of the previously discussed (price) targets.
Proof. See appendix D.
8 The numeraire
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) first showed that in general equilibrium mod-
els with non-atomistic agents and where Nash solution concepts are utilized,
the models will not be fully specified without choosing a numeraire. This nu-
meraire must then be founded in economic realities, as the choice of numeraire
matters when it comes to real variables in these models. Technically, it is
impossible to solve such a model without a preassigned numeraire, which is
only to say that the non-atomistic agents care about the choice of numeraire.
They do so because this choice determines their influence over the relative
prices in the economy.26
In models combining game theory and general equilibrium, we then have
to search for an economic basis on which to choose the numeraire. In models
like the one presented here, the Central Bank objective — or target — provides
us with such a real-world basis. If the Central Bank is an inflation fighter,
the inflation target (if credible) is seen as fixed by the agents in the econ-
omy. Agents with considerable market power could, additionally, take into
account how they influence prices in the economy given the fixed inflation
target. Similarly, any other Central Bank target, for instance fixed exchange
25Although not shown, any employment target would also be expected to have negative
strategic eﬀects on union wage setting (relative to the fixed exchange rate and inflation
targets). As discussed in some detail above, unions moderate their wage claims if prices
respond less and employment more to a wage increase. In whatever way it is implemented,
an employment target would be expected to provide a lower level of flexibility in employ-
ment, at least in one sector. In this case, unions would become more aggressive. The eﬀect
on total employment would of course depend on the Central Bank’s ability to implement
the target level of employment. We do not, however, continue this line of thought here.
26It is easily checked that monetary policy do not have an eﬀect on outcomes in the
totally decentralized case when union power is neglible (ms →∞). The same result would
apply to the totally centralized case with only one union covering all workers (not shown).
Thus the classical dichotomy between monetary policy and real variables, remain in these
cases — in the decentralized case because there are no agents with market power and in the
centralized case because the single union takes all relevant externalities into consideration.
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rates, may provide such a real world basis for the choice of numeraire. This
explains exactly how money neutrality breaks down in such models: Diﬀer-
ent Central Bank policy targets provide for diﬀerent numeraires, and non-
atomistic agents will respond to the change in numeraire, inducing diﬀerent
real outcomes.27
9 Implications and further remarks
Our results suggest that a small inflation targeting country with a large
and relatively strongly unionized shielded sector, may face the possibility
of increased unemployment if it enters into a monetary union. In such a
union, the exchange rates vis-à-vis the trading partners within the union are
fixed. The monetary union may very well be an inflation fighter, but it will
take inflation in all countries within the union into account. Consequently,
for a small country, this monetary policy may much more closely resemble
that of a fixed exchange rate regime than an inflation targeting regime. The
reduced discipline such a move will imply in relation to shielded sector wage
setting, may prove to be important if unemployment is already a cause of
concern. Although the model used in this paper focused on diﬀerent levels
of centralization in wage setting across sectors, the general idea that it may
provide superior employment levels to discipline unions in the sector where
they are strong, does not confine attention to the concept of centralization.
In fear of grossly overstating the potential policy impact of a stylized paper
like this one, it is interesting to note that if the table in the introduction is
indicative, and with the public sector being an important part of the shielded
sector, the UK government could be rightly cautious in their approach toward
the EMU.
On a technical note, it is also worth observing that the disciplining eﬀect
on the shielded sector unions in both the case of country-wide and shielded
sector inflation targeting, comes about because the monetary authorities
credibly commit to hurt workers and stock-holders in the non-shielded sector
(if wages in the shielded sector are high). Moving from a country-wide to a
shielded sector inflation target involves hurting the non-shielded sector even
more for any wage increase in the shielded sector. The unions in the non-
27The monetary target may also be thought of as the ‘nominal anchor’. The existence
of a stable nominal anchor has been stressed as an important prerequisite for healthy
economic development (Bernanke et al. (1999)). In models of general equilibrium with
Nash-playing agents, a tie-down of monetary policy is necessary to obtain an equilib-
rium. Without such a ‘nominal anchor’, no equilibrium can be found, with unpredictable
consequences for expectation formation and economic outcomes.
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shielded sector are, however, only negatively aﬀected by this policy change
if the unions in the shielded sector continue to set high wages. This is not
the case in equilibrium since these unions are disciplined by spillovers from
the non-shielded sector. Consequently, the non-shielded sector unions would
actually prefer the narrower price target because it gives them a chance to
increase wages without suﬀering an equally large drop in employment (com-
pared to what was the case under country-wide inflation targeting). It is
then natural to ask how union incentives for cooperation, both within and
across sectors, change with the monetary regime.28 This is left for further
work.
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Appendices
A Third stage equilibrium
In this appendix, we start out by discussing the supply side of the economy,
taking wages as a given. After also having determined domestic demand, we
find the relative prices in the shielded sector.
A.1 Supply
The firms decide the amount to supply on the basis of the goods’ prices and
wage levels only. No firms employ workers from more than one union, and
wages are equal for all workers within the firm. Profit maximizing behavior
implies choosing the following employment level in firm j producing the sector
s good:
Ljs = (
γps
wjs
)
1
1−γ . (31)
It is assumed that workers are willing to work the necessary amount at
the prevailing wage. This may not necessarily be the case, but as will be
shown in Appendix C, the assumption turns out to hold in equilibrium.
Production by firm j is then given by xjs = (
γps
wjs
)
γ
1−γ , and aggregating to
obtain total supply from sector s, we get
XSs =
fsX
j=1
(
γps
wjs
)
γ
1−γ , (32)
where superscript ‘S’ denotes supply.
A.2 Demand
The domestic demand for the two products is given by the total demand of
theN price taking, utility maximizing individuals that populate the economy.
The demand by a worker employed in firm j in sector s is the solution to
max
x1,x2,y
(
√
x1x2)
α(y)1−α s.t. wjs(T − y) = p1x1 + p2x2, (33)
where mjs = w
j
s(T − y) is the income of the individual. T is the total time
available to an employee for work and leisure.
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The income levels of the workers stem from their wage income. This is
in turn determined by the wage level and the amount of work required by
the employer. If the employer needs less work than the individual is ready
to supply at the prevailing wage, the individual cannot oﬀer to work at a
lower wage, so work would then be rationed. It is easily shown that work
is rationed whenever T − y = l ≤ αT. In these cases, demand for good
g ∈ {1, 2} by a worker employed in firm j in sector s is xg = w
j
sl
j
s
2pg
. As will be
shown (Appendix C), union wages will always be high enough to induce an
employment level lower than αT.
Aggregate demand also depends on the demand of the k firm owners. We
have assumed that each stockholder i gets a fraction φi of total profits in
the economy,
Pk
i=1 φ
i = 1. Since we have assumed firms to be price takers,
these stockholders simply maximize utility subject to their income being
their share of total profits in the economy. Following the assumption that
the stockholders’ leisure is exogenously given, utility maximization requires
xig =
φi(Π1+Π2)
2pg
, g ∈ {1, 2},where Πs is the total profits accrued by firms in
sector s.
With the present type of utility function for all individuals, the ideal
price index is readily accessible. The utility gained from consumption is
given by (short of a monotonic transformation)
√
x1x2 =
M
2
√
p1p2
= M
P
, for
any individual with income M. Thus P = 2
√
p1p2 is the ideal price index.
Adding up demand by workers and stockholders (in both sectors), it is
also easily shown that total demand (for the sector 1 product) only depends
on prices and the total income in the economy:
XD1 =
n1
f1
Pf1
j=1w
j
1l
j
1 +
n2
f2
Pf2
j=1w
j
2l
j
2 +Π1 +Π2
2p1
, (34)
where superscript ‘D’ denotes demand and ljs is the employment level of a
worker in firm j in sector s. Thus the distribution of profits across stock-
holders and the distribution of wage income across workers do not matter for
demand. This is a convenient result stemming from Cobb-Douglas utility in
consumption.29
A.3 Third stage equilibrium in prices
We have assumed that the sector 2 good can be produced both at home and
abroad. Accordingly, home production need not be equal to home demand.30
29The same would be true for a CES-type utility function.
30However, in equilibrium, trade will be balanced.
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However, in the case of the shielded good, prices are determined by equating
domestic demand and supply. We know (and it is easily calculated) that the
value of production, psXSs equals labor costs and profits. Since total demand
only depends on total labor costs and profits in the economy (as discussed
above), equating supply, XS1 , with demand, X
D
1 , implies
XS1 =
p1X
S
1 + p2X
S
2
2p1
=
1
2
[XS1 +
p2X
S
2
p1
]. (35)
Thus supply creates its own demand through labor income and profits. This
gives rise to the possibility of an upward sloping demand curve.31 However,
since a rise in supply leads to a 50% rise in demand, an increase in sup-
ply never leads to a relatively larger increase in demand, ensuring that any
equilibrium calculated from (35) is stable.
Rearranging the above equation, we get
1 =
1
2
[1 +
p2
p1
XS2
XS1
]. (36)
We observe that the relative prices in equilibrium can be derived solely from
the relative supply in the two sectors. Now, using our previous results, it is
also easy to show that relative supply depends only on relative prices:
XS2
XS1
=
Pf2
j=1(
γp2
wj2
)
γ
1−γPf1
j=1(
γp1
wj1
)
γ
1−γ
=
Pf2
j=1(
1
wj2
)
γ
1−γPf1
j=1(
1
wj1
)
γ
1−γ
(
p2
p1
)
γ
1−γ . (37)
Thus if the relative prices only depend on relative supply, and relative supply
only depends on relative prices, then (36) and (37) determine an equilibrium
in relative prices where the ratio of the two prices is constant. The reason
why an exogenous 10% increase in the sector 2 prices are followed by exactly
a 10% increase in the sector 1 prices can then be attributed to the fact that
both sectors have access to the same technology. If the parameter γ diﬀered
across sectors, this rather special result would not prevail. However, it makes
for a tidier analysis.
31When the price of the good increases, the demand response is governed by four eﬀects:
The substitution eﬀect and the familiar income eﬀect both contribute to lower demand.
However, in a general equilibrium set-up there are two additional eﬀects: First of all, a
higher price in sector 1 induces higher production and employment in that sector, increas-
ing the wage bill of workers. This endogenous wage bill eﬀect contributes positively to
demand. At the same time, the price increase benefits stockholders through an accom-
panying endogenous profit eﬀect, also leading to higher demand. These eﬀects may well
dominate the two other eﬀects, leading to an upward sloping demand curve.
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The equilibrium is then easily calculated from (36) and (37):32
p1
p2
, K = (
Pf2
j=1(
1
wj2
)
γ
1−γPf1
j=1(
1
wj1
)
γ
1−γ
)(1−γ). (38)
B Elasticities
In this appendix, we calculate the elasticities, πs and λs.
From A1, imposing the pricing game equilibrium of A3, the labor demand
faced by a member of the union u is (remember that each firm has a labor
stock of n
fs
and that lus represents the labor demand facing a single worker
who is a member of union u)
lu1 =
f1
n
(
γp1
wu1
)
1
1−γ =
f1
n
(
γKp2
wu1
)
1
1−γ , (39)
lu2 =
f2
n
(
γp2
wu2
)
1
1−γ . (40)
From these, the labor demand elasticities faced by each union can be calcu-
lated:
λu1 =
∂lu1
∂wu1
wu1
lu1
=
1
1− γ (
wu1
K
∂K
∂wu1
+
wu1
p2
∂p2
∂wu1
− 1), (41)
λu2 =
∂lu2
∂wu2
wu2
lu2
=
1
1− γ (
wu2
p2
∂p2
∂wu2
− 1). (42)
wus
K
∂K
∂wus
, s = 1, 2 can be calculated using the definition of K in (38). Since all
firms covered by union u faces the same wages, K can be rewritten (summa-
rizing over unions):
K = (
f2
m2
Pm2
v=1(
1
wv2
)
γ
1−γ
f1
m1
Pm1
v=1(
1
wv1
)
γ
1−γ
)(1−γ).
32If we had chosen instead a (CES-) utility function of the form: U(x1, x2, y) = {[(x1)ρ+
(x2)
ρ]
1
ρ }α{y}1−α, ρ ∈ (←, 1]/{0}, the relative pricing game equilibrium would have become
p1
p2
= K
1−ρ
1−γρ . However, due to reasons of tractability, we have chosen to work with the
simpler twin Cobb-Douglas utility function.
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This yields
κu1 ,
∂K
∂wu1
wu1
K
=
γ
(wu1 )
γ
1−γ
Pm1
v=1(
1
wv1
)
γ
1−γ
, (43)
κu2 ,
∂K
∂wu2
wu2
K
= − γ
(wu2 )
γ
1−γ
Pm2
v=1(
1
wv2
)
γ
1−γ
. (44)
Note that when a union changes its wage claims, this aﬀects all firms that
employ members of that union ( fs
ms
firms).
The general price level elasticities can also be calculated. With P =
2
√
p1p2, we have
πus =
wus
P
∂P
∂wus
=
1
2
(
wus
p1
∂p1
∂wus
+
wus
p2
∂p2
∂wus
). (45)
Now, again imposing the third stage equilibrium, p1 = Kp2, we have
πus =
1
2
((
wus
K
∂K
∂wus
+
wus
p2
∂p2
∂wus
) +
wus
p2
∂p2
∂wus
)
=
1
2
[κus + 2
wus
p2
∂p2
∂wus
]. (46)
Every union within a sector is exactly equal in all respects. Given that
two unions face the same outside wages from its ‘rival’ unions, they face
the same elasticities of demand and prices to own wages. Then there exist
sector-wise symmetric wage game equilibria, and we therefore frequently use
the elasticities in the symmetric cases (dropping superscripts), where
κ1 =
γ
m1
, (47)
κ2 = −
γ
m2
. (48)
C Rationing of work
In the previous analysis, we assumed that workers were not allowed to work as
much as they wanted to at the prevailing wage. This implies that ls ≤ αT, or
equivalently, ls
T−ls ≤
α
1−α . Here, we show this to be valid in the cases discussed
in the paper:
For the fixed exchange rate regime, the above inequalities are reduced to
1
2
γ
2m1 − 1− γ
m1 − γ
≤ 1, (49)
1
2
γ
2m2 − 1 + γ
m2
≤ 1. (50)
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Both these inequalities hold for γ ≤ 1.33
For the case of inflation targeting, we similarly need
γ
2ms − 1
2ms − γ
≤ 1,
which again holds trivially for γ ≤ 1.
D Production targets
In this appendix, we discuss the possibility of providing the Central Bank
with a production target. We assume that monetary policy is aimed at
keeping a weighted sum of the nominal production values in the two sectors
at a specific target level. We assign weights, β and 1 − β, β ∈ [0, 1], to the
value of production in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. Letting V denote the
target level, we then have
βp1
f1X
j=1
(
γp1
wj1
)
γ
1−γ + (1− β) p2
f2X
j=1
(
γp2
wj2
)
γ
1−γ = V. (51)
Even though the Central Bank aims at keeping the weighted value of pro-
duction fixed, the relative prices will still be determined by p1 = Kp2. Sub-
stituting into the above expressions yields
p2
1
1−γ [βK
1
1−γ
f1X
j=1
(
γ
wj1
)
γ
1−γ + (1− β)
f2X
j=1
(
γ
wj2
)
γ
1−γ ] = V. (52)
Using the definition of K, the above expression simplifies to
p2
1
1−γ
f2X
j=1
(
γ
wj2
)
γ
1−γ = V. (53)
Thus, in this model, any value-of-production target will amount to target-
ing the value of production in the non-shielded sector. The reason is that a
wage increase in sector 1 will reduce production with the exact same frac-
tion as it increases prices. Thus the value of production in this sector stays
the same, and the Central Bank eﬀectively pays no attention to sector 1.
In the non-shielded sector, however, a wage increase will, without Central
33This then also holds for a shielded sector inflation target.
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Bank intervention, only lead to a decrease in production. To keep the tar-
get, the Central Bank will then compensate by inducing an exchange rate
depreciation.34
Following the above discussion, dp2
dwu1
wu1
p2
= 0 for all nominal production
targets. Using (53) and imposing symmetry, we obtain dp2
dwu2
wu2
p2
= γ
m2
. Equi-
librium employment in sector s is then implicitly given by
α
1− α(
1
2
γ
2ms − 1− γ
ms − γ
) =
ls
T − ls
. (54)
It is worth noting that employment in sector 1 is as it would have been under
a fixed exchange rate. This follows trivially since dp2
dwu1
wu1
p2
= 0. Furthermore,
employment in the competitive sector is strictly higher under exchange rate
targeting. With a given value of production target, a wage increase in sector 2
will increase prices. This would not have happened under a credible exchange
rate target, and following the discussion in Section 7.1, it is the opposite of
what is needed in order to induce high employment.
It is important to realize, however, that the invariability of these results
with respect to the type of value-of-production target, depends crucially on
the Cobb Douglas preferences and the fact that each individual’s spending
on each good is a constant share of his or her income. Without this assump-
tion, it would matter which sector’s value of production is targeted. In any
case, however, a price target yields a sharper focus on wages (which are the
variables that matter) than does a production target.
34As long as the value of production in the non-shielded sector remains the same, there
is no spillover into the shielded sector, as the value of production exactly equals the payoﬀ
to labor and capital (Appendix A).
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